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RepossessionExperience:
Automobiles
OUT of any mass of instalment deals some will become delin-
quent, and of these some will necessitate refinancing or even•
tual repossession of the article financed. All three sources of
difficulty entail costs to the retailer or his finance company,,
either in increased collection expense or in actual loss. But
in instalment sales financing the most convenient test of the
effectiveness of credit procedures, standards and terms is ex-
perience in regard to repossessions.
In this matter different finance companies will necessarily
have different experience. Some will aim to control repos-
sessions as closely as possible; others will not object to L
greaternumber, providing financing charges are high enough
to cover costs;still others will emphasize volume and its
economies as a compensation for the assumption of greater
risk. Also, much will depend on the type of finance business
conducted—recourse or repurchase business, with reposses-
sion risk shared by the dealer, or non-recourse business with
the full risk assumed by the finance company.
It must not be forgotten that it is through the retail dealer
that the sales finance company serves consumers. The dealer
is the first judge of a consumer's creditworthiness; the sales
finance company merely has the right of a credit veto, though
for reasons of competition it must stand ready to take what-
ever paper a creditable dealer offers, at least within limits,
insisting or not, in all or special cases, on dealer participation
in the risk. Total repossession experience, in a sense, reflects
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the composite performance of a system of consumer financing
in. which some unfavorable credit experience is unpredict-
able and inevitable, some predictable but for one reason or
another unavoidable, and some predictable but. deliberately
not avoided.
The analysis contained in this and the following chapter
represents a survey of the repossession experience of the
finance companies themselves, rather than a discussion of
what repossession implies for the consumer or for the gen-
eral functioning of the system of distribution. In most cases,
of course, the buyer who must relinquish his purchase be-
cause he cannot complete payment for it suffers a financial
loss as well as a deprivation of what he has come to consider
as his property—though it may sometimes be possible that
his use of the good, before its repossession, was commensu-
rate with the amount he had invested in it up to that time.
The extent of his loss, however, the reasons for it, the effects
it may have on his financial condition, and the discovery of
standards by which it might have been avoided, are de-
pendent on his personal situation. Some of the answers to
such questions can be inferred from the following analyses
of company records. Complete answers could be reached only
by surveying individually the thousands of buyers whose
purchases have been repossessed.
MEASURES OF REPOSSESSION EXPERIENCE
Probably the commonest and most easily understandable
measure of unfavorable credit experience in sales financing
is the repossession ratio—the average number of reposses-
sions per hundred articles financed. This measure is not en-
tirely adequate, for it fails to indicate the actual loss resulting
from repossessions. Loss can be indicated by the repossession
loss ratio—the average dollar losses from repossessions per
hundred dollars of finance paper handled. But this ratio is158 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
ambiguous because of the variation in the methods of estab-
lishing the amount of loss; the latter may or may not include
indirect expenses. Moreover, apparent repossession loss ratios
differ substantially as between recourse and non-recourse
companies. A recourse company includes only those losses
which it has to bear itself, and excludes those it can transfer
back to the dealer. A non-recourse company may include only
direct losses resulting from repossessions, but it may include
indirect costs as well. And both types of companies may in-
clude other losses, such as those due to collision, "skip" and
the like, where no actual repossession occurs, or those due to
adjustments or miscellaneous causes.
Because of the difficulties involved in the repossession loss
ratio the following discussion will make use of the reposses-
sion ratio as the measure of repossession experience. In most
circumstances the pattern of repossession experience may
expected to be the same whether measured by one ratio or
the other: one would normally expect a high repossession
ratio to be associated with a high repossession loss ratio.
In several instances the repossession ratios have been re-
formulated in an "index of repossession experience," in order
to indicate more clearly the relative significance of differ-
ences. This has been done by calculating each repossession
ratio as a percent of the average repossession ratio, and SUb-
tracting 100. The result shows the extent to which each ratio
deviates from the average of all ratios, a plus value indicat-
ing worse than average and a minus value indicating better
than average.
The intention of this analysis is to relate repossession ex-
perience to as many relevant factors affecting it as available
data permit. Such factors include down payment, length of
contract, price, age of commodity purchased and number of
payments made, as well as the immediate reasons for repcs-
session. A complete analysis should relate repossession ex-
perience to such purchaser factors as income, occupation, ageREPOSSESSION: AUTOMOBILES 159
and other relevant characteristics, but data for such a study
are as yet unavailable.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA
The data for the following analysis ot automobile repos-
session experience were taken from the records of a single
company, but one which operates throughout the country
and handles a substantial percentage of all automobile fi-
nance paper written in the United States. It must not be
assumed that the experience of this single organization—
which will be referred to hereafter as the source company
—is altogether typical of automobile sales financing in gen-
eral, but it is safe to say that any relationships, tendencies
and patterns which are generally prevalent in automobile
repossession experience are to be found in the extremely
comprehensive records of this company.
In considering these figures it should be borne in mind
that retail dealers and finance company credit men have come
to know from long practice that certain factors affect the
likelihood of repossession, and that these factors naturally
influence their selection of credit risks. Any quantitative
data on repossession experience necessarily reflect the prior
judgments of dealers and credit men, and these judgments
reflect in turn their credit standards—a more or less defined
set of facts, rules or principles that are used in deciding to
whom credit will be granted, and how much. Conclusions
drawn from such data are therefore subject to limitations;
it is always possible that the relationship between reposses-
sion experience and some relevant factor has been compen-
sated by these selective activities, or even that it has been
overcompensated, the relationship shown being thus the re-
verse of what it might have been without such sifting.
The data on which the following analysis is based cover
the repossession experience of the source company on carsi6o SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
financed during the years 1933-36. The repossessions are cal-
culated as of December 31, 1937; the majority, but not all,
of the contracts written in 1936 had been terminated by this
date.1 Since our primary interest is in the general pattern,
and since in conformity to the pattern one year shows no
striking difference from another, we have taken the average
for the period.
The source company's data cover a total of 4,064,666
passenger-car contracts financed at retail during the years
1933-36. Of these, 1,804,607 were for new cars and 2,260,059
were for used cars. The principal features of this body of
contracts averaged as follows, in absolute amount and in
percent of cash selling price:
Xew Cars Used Cars All Cars
Cash selling price $809100% $314100% $534100%
Down payment 344 43 125 40 222 42
Original unpaid balance 465 57 189 60 312 58
Combined finance charge
and insurance premium 77 10 43 14 58ii
Amount of note 542 67 232 74 370 69
Monthly payment2 32 4 18 6 25 5
Length of contract 16.7 months 13.0 months 14.6 months
REPOSSESSION EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO
NUMBER OF INSTALMENTS PAID
It is well known that repossessions occur most frequently
within the first few months after contracts are written, a
fact which explains the especially intensive collection efforts
that are usual in these months. Table 34 shows that about,
half of new-car repossessions and seven out of ten used-car
repossessions occur before four payments are made. Almost
eight out of ten new-car and over nine out of ten used-car
In the following tabulations renewals are counted as repossessions.
2Obtainedby dividing average amount of note by average length of contract.REPOSSESSION: AUTOMOBILES i6i
TABLE 34
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AND CUMULATIVE PER-
CENTAGE OF REPOSSESSIONS, 1933—37, ON NEW AND

















0 13.5 13.5 23.0 23.0
1 12.1 25.6 18.6 41.6
2 12.7 38.3. 16.4 58.0
3 11.9 50.2 13.3 71.3
4 10.7 60.9 9.7 81.0
5 9.2 70.1 7.0 88.0
6 7.4 77.5 4.7 92.7
7 5.8 83.3 3.0 95.7
8 4.4 87.7 1.9 97.6
9 3.6 .91.3 1.1 98.7
l0&over 8.7 100.0 1.3 100.0
TOTAL 100.0 . 100.0
Based on data supplied by a large sales finance company, covering 57,739
new-car and 35&052 used-car repossessions. The repossessions are classified
according to the year in which they took place and not according to the
year in which the transaction originated.
repossessions occur before seven payments, and nine out of
ten new-car and practically all used-car repossessions come be-
fore the tenth payment. For new cars cumulative reposses-
sion percentages are consistently lower than they are for used
cars, showing that repossessions on the latter typically occur
earlier than those on new cars. This is partly explainable by
the generally shorter duration. of used-car contracts.
CONTRACT TERMS AS FACTORS IN REPOSSESSION
The role of standard terms covering down payment and
length of contract in automobile financing has already been162 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
discussed. The reason the trade is interested in such
terms is attested by the relationship of the repossession ratio
to various down payments and lengths of contract. Table 35
indicates that for both new and used cars the repossession
ratio declines sharply and consistently as the down payment
increases. For both groups itis substantially higher than
average for down payments of less than 35 percent of cash
selling price, about average in the 36-40 percent down pay-
ment level and less than average when down payment us
above 40 percent. This fully confirms the common belief in
automobile circles that the more a purchaser pays down, that
is, the greater his initial equity, the lower the probability
that he will fail to complete his payments.
TABLE 35
REPOSSESSION EXPERIENCE, 1933—37, ON NEW AND
USED CARS FINANCED DURING 1933—36, BY DOWN
PAyMENTa
Down Repossession Index of Reposses- % Distribution l?f
Payment
(in%of
Ratio1' sion Experience All Cars Financed
—
cash selling New Used New Used New Used
price) Cars Cars Cars Cars Cars Cars
Under20 7.8 19.7 +188.9+69.8 1.6 1.6
20—29 6.4 18.4 +137.0-1-58.6 10.8 11.1
30—32 4.9 16.4 ± 81.5+41.4 6.4 8.4
33—35 3.9 14.5 + 44.4+25.0 23.9 25.5
36—40 2.5 11.8 —7.4+1.7 12.3 21.3
41—49 1.2 7.7 — 55.6—33.6 17.0 16.2
50&over .4 3.4 — 85.2—70.7 28.0 15.9
ALLCARS 2.7 11.6 100.0100.0
Based on data supplied by a large sales finance company, covering
new-car and 2,260,059 used-car contracts.
bNumberof repossesslons per hundred cars financed.
Obtained by calculating each repossession ratio as a percent of average
repossession ratio and subtracting 100; the result shows each level's devia•
lion from the average of all levels, the plus indicating worse than average
and the minus indicating better than average.REPOSSESSION: AUTOMOBILES 163
TABLE 36
REPOSSESSION EXPERIENCE, 1933—37, NEW AND











New Used New Used New Used
Cars Cars Cars Cars Cars Cars
1— 5 1.1 11.6 —59.3 .0 3.3 3.2
6—11 2.3 15.1 —14.8 +30.2 8.2 23.9
12 1.8 11.1 —33.3—4.3 31.1 59.8
13—17 3.5 9.2 +29.6 —20.7 4.0 3.3
18 3.2 6.5 +18.5 —44.0 45.5 9.3
Over 18 3.7 8.8 +37.0 —24.1 7.9 .5
ALLCARS 2.7 11.6 .100.0 100.0
Based on data supplied by a large sales finance company, covering 1,804,607
new-car and 2,260,059 used-car contracts.
bSeeTable 85, footnote b.
cSeeTable 85, footnote c.
Table 36 shows that for new cars the shorter the duration
of contract the smaller the repossession ratio—again a find-
ing that the automobile trade affirms. One would expect this
relationship to be consistent for both new and used cars,
since a shorter contract increases owner's equity more rapidly,
and also reduces the period in which some untoward event
may prevent a completion of the obligation. The present
table indicates that, on the contrary, the used-car repossession
ratio varies inversely with length of contract. This should
not, however, be understood to mean that in the financing
of used cars a longer contract usually provides a better risk.
It means, rather, that dealers and finance company credit
men are so well aware of the possible hazard in granting the
longer contracts on used cars that customers receiving them
are selected with special care. In this table the figures on the
percentage distribution of all cars financed show that con-164 SALES.FINANCE COMPANIES
tracts of 12 months or less are required of seven-eighths of
all used-car buyers but of less than half this proportion o:E
new-car buyers. Also, as will be shown presently, contracts
on the lower-priced, higher-risk used cars are conspicuously
shorter than on the more costly used cars of more receni;
manufacture.
CASH SELLING PRICE AS A FACTOR IN
REPOSSESSION
Only for used cars are data available on the relationship be-
tween repossession and cash selling price. Table 37, which
gives the source company's repossession ratio for eleven price
TABLE 37
REPOSSESSION EXPERIENCE, 1933—37, ON USED CARS











Under $100 20.9 +79.5 4.2
100—200 16.3 +40.2 27.8
200—300 12.0 + 2.8 24.2
300—400 9.6 —17.5 17.2
400—500 7.1 —39.0 12.9
500—600 6.0 —48.6 7.3
600—700 6.0 —48.7 3.4
700—800 5.7 —50.9 1.5
800—900 6.0 —48.7 .7
900—1000 5.9 —49.7 .3
1000&over 6.8 —41.9 .5
ALL CARS 11.6 100.0
a Basedon data supplied by a
used-car contracts.
large sales finance company,covering 2,260,059
b Eachlevel is inclusive ofthe
See Table 35,footnoteb.
lower figure and exclusiveof thehigher.
d SeeTable 35,footnotec.
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levels,shows that for used cars the most unfavorable repos-
session experience is with those of lower price. As used-car
prices increase to $500 there is a distinct tendency for re-
possessions to diminish; above the $500 level there is no
appreciable change.
On the basis of this evidence one might designate used
cars selling for less than $300 as bad risks subject to a rela-
tively high probability of repossession, those selling at be-
tween $300 and $500 as an intermediate risk group, and those
selling for prices upward of $500 as a relatively good risk.
As has been shown in earlier tables of this chapter, the re-
possession ratio for used cars tends to run materially higher
than that for new cars, averaging more than four times as
much, according to source company data for 1933-36. Even
for the low-risk, high-priced used cars, that is, those selling
for $500 and over, the repossession ratio is more than twice
the average for all new cars.
The tendency for repossession experience to be better for
higher- than for lower-priced used cars is readily understand-
able. For one thing, those who buy the higher-priced cars
have made a higher absolute cash investment, and therefore
when it is possible to continue payments, even though it is
not easy, they are likely to be much less inclined to let their
cars go. Furthermore there is much greater likelihood of pur-
chaser dissatisfaction with the lower-priced cars, which are
necessarily the oldest and mechanically the poorest. Supple-
mentary data, not tabulated here, reveal a fairly pronounced
tendency for repossessions to increase with age of car.
CONTRACT TERMS AND PRICE AS COMPOSITE
FACTORS IN REPOSSESSION
That repossession experience varies by down payment, con-
tract and cash selling price has already been indicated.
It remains to consider these three factors together so thati66 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
their various interrelationships may be studied. Sales finance
companies seldom tabulate their repossession data by more
than one or two basic factors, but one comprehensive tabu-
lation of the source company's used-car repossession exper:i-
ence is available for 1937. This is given in Table 38, and it
provides both a summary and an elaboration of observations
already made. The table confirms, for example, the tendency
for used-car repossessions to decrease as down payment in-
creases; with one minor exception3 this tendency is present
throughout, for all prices and for all contract lengths. Sini-
ilarly, the tendency for used-car repossessions to decrease as
price increases is shown here to be consistent for all down
payment percentages, and for all contract lengths.
This more ramified tabulation helps also to explain the
apparent paradox that was evident in the direct relationship
between length of contract and used-car repossession experi-
ence. It is true that when price is disregarded the reposses-
sion ratio declines with longer contracts, regardless of what
the down payment may be. But in each of the three price
levels itemized here the ratios for "all cars" tend to move
in the expected direction as contracts become longer. Still
more significant is the indication that longer contracts are
granted mainly for higher-priced cars. Approximately a third
of the cars financed in this period carried contracts running
more than 12 months, and of these cars 80 percent sold for
$400 or more, a price group that was conspicuously better
than any other in its repossession record.
The importance of using a detailed analysis, such as is
presented in Table 38, as a means of confirming the general
tendencies revealed by simple relationships, may be illus-
trated by reference to the problem of finance charges. Let us
3The exception is for cars costing less than $200, with contracts running
longer than 12 months. Here the repossession ratio on contracts calling
34-40 percent down payment is slightly higher than on those calling for less
than 34 percent; even on these contracts, however, there is a decrease from














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)i68 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
suppose a finance company concluded that if it used a given
schedule of charges it could not afford to finance any group
of automobiles on which the repossession ratio was more
than 16 out of every hundred cars financed. Table 38 shows
that the used-car repossession ratio averages 22 for cars cost-
ing under $200, 19 for contracts running less than 9 months,
and 20 for all cars with down payments of 34 percent and
under. The company might conclude that all of these groups
present unsatisfactory risks, except on the basis of a premium
finance charge. Thus such a charge would be required on
some 57 percent of used-car contracts. If, however, the corn,-
pany examined the record in more detail it would find that
the used-car contracts which would prove unsatisfactory oi,i
the basis of scheduled charges would be confined to four
groups: those in the price-class under $400 with down pay-
ments under 34 percent; those in the price-class under $200
with down payments of 34 to 40 percent; those in the price-
class under $200 with contract lengths over 12 months; those
in the $200-400 price-class with contract lengths under 9
months and no more than 40 percent down payment. Thus,
on the basis of past repossession experience, the finance com-
pany could expect to subject about 65 percent of the con-
tracts to its scheduled finance charge, and to require a
premium charge on only 35 percent of its used-car contracts.
This illustration merely serves to show that care must be
used in applying experience data to practical problems.
Under a given rate schedule down payment and other re-
quirements may be profitably relaxed when other indic:a-
dons are satisfactory, and they may have to be tightened
when other indications are unsatisfactory.
IMMEDIATE REASONS FOR REPOSSESSION
In addition to the significance of contract terms and price as
factors in repossession, it is important to understand the im-REPOSSESSION: AUTOMOBILES 169
mediate reasons that make repossession necessary. But any
analysis of repossession experience according to this classifi-
cation is bound to encounter difficulties. For one thing, the
very term "reason for repossession" is somewhat ambiguous.
Other terms have been suggested, such as "reason for default"
or "reason for delinquency," but these are equally unsatis-
factory; since repossession is a last resort after all other
methods of adjustment have failed, delinquency and default
have already occurred, and, although they are usually at-
tributable to the same reason as repossession, they may some-
times be caused by slightly different circumstances. A second
major source of difficulty is that of setting up mutually ex-
clusive categories of reasons. Most cases of repossession reflect
a set of complicated circumstances involving the purchaser,
and itis well-nigh impossible to establish a classification
which will not allow a given case to fall legitimately in any
one of several classes.
On the basis of its experience the source company has
classified five broad categories of reasons for repossession,
each of which is broken down into two or more subdivisions.
The first category includes cases of "financial risk" or "weak
initial credit."It is intended to cover purchasers who over-
estimated their ability to pay, and also those who found
automobile upkeep too high to continue. The second cate-
gory covers "moral risk" or "intentional breach of faith,"
and includes a variety of sins on the part of the purchaser:
confiscation (car recovered from federal, state or municipal
authorities following seizure); conversion (purchaser disposes
of car, necessitating repossession from third party); collision
(purchaser unwilling to repair car and continue his obliga-
tion); abandonment; insurance claims (resulting in reposses-
sion because purchaser will not continue with his account);
change in wants of the consumer; misuse of car (value of car
not worth amount of remaining payments because of bad
treatment accorded it by purchaser); intention to convert170 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
(including all cases not elsewhere provided for, where car
has been secreted intentionally or otherwise).
The third group includes cases of "reverses": financial re-
verses (loss of job, reduction of salary, business difficulties
and the like); personal reverses (illness, injury or death to
purchaser or some member of his family); litigation against
purchaser; and major catastrophes, such as flood or hurricane.
The fourth category covers dissatisfaction on the part of the
purchaser with the mechanical condition of his car, or with
the service he receives, and under this heading are also in-
cluded cases in which the purchaser "claims misrepresenta-
tion as to year, model, terms, etc.," and cases of "insufficient
equity either at time of purchase or subsequent thereto." The
fifth and last group includes cases of fraudulent or fictitious
sale, such as is sometimes arranged by dealers for the pur-
pose of raising money.
Table 39 shows for both new and used cars the relative
importance of the five main categories of reasons for repos-
session, and the way in which the repossession ratio is dis-
tributed among them. Reverses stand out as by far th,e
foremost reason for repossession, with financial risk second;
together these two groups account for 82 percent of both new-
and used-car repossessions. The financial risk group, it will
be remembered, includes purchasers who overestimated thei.r
ability to pay or found car upkeep too high for their income.
Presumably with careful credit selection these cases, which
totaled just under a third of both new- and used-car repos-
sessions, could have been detected and their paper refused;
the balance, or slightly more than two-thirds of the repos-
session cases of this one company, were unpredictable and
unavoidable. In other words, roughly one out of every hun-
dred new-car instalment deals resulted in repossession that
would have been preventable, by prior credit selection, while
about two out of every hundred new-car deals ended in un-
preventable repossession. For used cars, more careful creditREPOSSESSION: AUTOMOBILES 171
TABLE 39
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION or REPOSSESSIONS, 1933—37,
ONNEW AND USED CARS FINANCED DURING 1933—36,











Financial Risk• 29.3 .8
Moral Risk 16.8 .5
Reverses 52.5 1 .4
Dissatisfaction 1 .3 °
Fraud .1 0








ALL REASONS 100.0 11.6
Based on data supplied by a large sales finance company, covering 57,739
new-car and 354,052 used-car repossessions.
I)Ratiosfor individual reasons are computed by multiplying the ratio for all
reasons (total number of repossessions per hundred cars financed) by the per-
centages in the preceding column.
Less than 0.05 percent.
selection might have reduced the average number of deals
ending in repossession from around twelve out of every hun-
dred to approximately eight.
Table 40gives,for both new and used cars, and for each
category of reasons, the cumulative percentage of reposses-
sions by number of instalments paid. This table shows that
before ten payments have been made there is little difference
in the relative importance of the various reasons for repos-
session; in other words, more than nine out of ten new-car























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tenth payment, regardless of reason. The only significant
variation as between reasons appears in the first few months
of the instalment period. Before the second payment a larger
percentage of dissatisfaction repossessions occur than of those
for any other reason. This suggests that instalment purchasers
are more likely to become dissatisfied shortly after purchase
than later, and that comparatively few purchasers, no matter
how dissatisfied, are willing to permit repossession after they
have made a number of payments, unless they are for some
other reason unable to continue paying.